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ABSTRACT 
Whether or not macroeconomics is a science depends on the scientific nature 
of macroeconomic theories and how the discipline responds when the 
empirical evidence fails to match the underlying assumptions and predictions 
of the theories.  By way of an example, four conditions for macroeconomics 
to be a science are developed and used to examine the ‘modern’ theories of the 
Phillips curve.  It is found that while the discipline in general maintains one 
condition it routinely violates the other three.  This suggests the 
macroeconomics discipline has some way to go before it can call itself a ‘pure 
science’. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper develops a framework to answer the question: where does macroeconomics lie in 
the spectrum between ‘pure’ faith and ‘pure’ science?1  This question initially appears not to 
have an answer as it has a number of dimensions and is complicated by the spectrum not being 
uniquely defined.  However, in the next section it is demonstrated by way of an example that 
for a discipline to be a ‘pure’ science it needs to meet four conditions.  These conditions identify 
the types of theories that are relevant for a science and how a discipline uses empirical evidence 
to examine the theories. 
In Sections 3 and 4 the conditions are applied to the Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) (F-P) 
expectations augmented and New Keynesian (NK) theories of the Phillips curve as two 
examples of dominant macroeconomic theories of the past five decades.  A similar analysis can 
be applied to other macroeconomic theories.  It is found that while the ‘modern’ theories of the 
Phillips curve are scientific in the sense of Popper (1959) it appears that the empirical validity 
of the assumptions underlying the model and their associated predictions are somewhat 
compromised.2  In particular, important model defining underlying assumptions of the F-P and 
NK models appear to be empirically invalid.  It is common to defend the use of empirically 
invalid assumptions in macroeconomics on the grounds that agents behave ‘as if’ the 
assumption is true.  This defence is considered in Section 5 before returning to the question 
concerning the status of macroeconomics as a science in Section 6.  Finally Section 7 discusses 
briefly how this framework relates to the philosophy of science and concludes. 
2. FOUR CONDITIONS FOR A DISCIPLINE TO BE A SCIENCE 
Imagine an island community that does not have the technology to understand how the island 
is part of the world, solar system and universe.  On this island the dominant theory of the ‘sun 
discipline’ is that the passage of the sun through the sky is controlled by the god Tron who at 
                                                 
1  This paper grows out of a long literature that examines a range of methodological issues surrounding 
macroeconomics including the thought provoking papers of Sims (1980), Mäki (1994, 2009), Sugden (2000), 
Caballero (2010), Fair (2012), Howitt (2012), Kozicki (2012), Uhlig (2012) and the contributors to Medema 
and Samuels (1996). 
2  Popper (1959) defines a theory is ‘scientific’ if it produces empirically testable predictions. 
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the end of the day extinguishes and dismantles the sun before next morning reassembling, 
lighting and throwing it back up into the air from the other side of the island.  Tron theory 
predicts that there is day and night and the sun ‘goes down’ before ‘rising’ the next day.  These 
predictions are empirically falsifiable and therefore Tron theory is scientific in the sense of 
Popper (1959).  Furthermore, as the predictions cannot be empirically falsified, Tron theory is 
a valid description of the data.  One can imagine that over time Tron theory becomes more 
‘rigorous’ utilising high level mathematics, internally consistent micro-foundations and 
optimising behaviour of some form.  Note that these are notional characteristics of the theory 
and not necessary for the theory to be scientific.3 
After many years an alternative theory develops that assumes (i) the island is on a planet, and 
(ii) the planet is spinning on its own axis with respect to the sun.  Consequently, it is the spinning 
of the planet that causes the sun to set and rise on a daily basis.  The alternative theory has the 
same predictions as Tron theory, it is also scientific and it is also consistent with the data.  Given 
that the predictions of both theories are empirically valid and the underlying assumptions cannot 
be examined due to the lack of technology the dominant theory is the one with the most 
desirable notional characteristics.  In this case Tron theory dominates the alternative theory as 
the later does not incorporate the god Tron, has no rigorous micro-foundations and is not 
mathematical.4 
Consider now an improvement in technology whereby it is observed that the island is indeed 
on a planet spinning on its axis with respect to the sun.  The predictions of both theories are still 
consistent with the data but now the underlying assumptions of Tron theory are empirically 
observed to be perfectly incorrect in the sense that the assumptions are never correct. 
In this example the two theories are both valid empirical descriptions of the data which allows 
us to focus on the role of the underlying assumptions on whether the ‘sun discipline’ is a 
science.  The Tron theorists may reject the empirical evidence and argue that while the 
assumptions of the model, and in particular the role played by the god Tron, are not literally 
                                                 
3  Notional is defined as an idea existing only in theory and/or only in the imagination. 
4  It is likely that the proponents of the alternative theory will develop the same notional modelling 
characteristics as Tron theory in an attempt to avoid the criticism of not being ‘rigorous’. 
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true the passage of the sun through the sky can be modelled ‘as if’ Tron exists.  This response 
may be motivated by a non-scientific attachment to the underlying assumptions possibly due to 
the theorists not wanting their human capital, influence and status to be extinguished by the 
proponents of the alternative theory or they politically support the policy recommendations that 
follow directly from the underlying assumptions.5  Alternatively, Tron theorists may reject or 
change their theory not because the predictions are invalid but because the underlying 
assumptions of the theory are empirically invalid. 
At such critical moments in the evolution of theories not everyone in a discipline will respond 
in the same way.  However, those who remain Tron theorists in the above example might be 
classified as ‘faith’ based theorists in the sense they are faithfully adhering (for whatever 
reason) to previously held views in the face of the empirical evidence.  Those who reject Tron 
theory and accept the alternative theory as a better description (but not necessarily a perfect 
description) of the data are scientists in the sense that their ‘test’ of the two models is based on 
empirical evidence as emphasised by Popper.  Note that it is not whether the theorist prior to 
the new empirical evidence believed in Tron theory that determines if they are guided by ‘faith’ 
or ‘science’ but how the theorist responds to the new empirical evidence concerning the 
assumptions. 
Extending this concept from the individual theorist to the discipline is more complicated.  If 
Tron theory is rejected and the alternative theory becomes the dominant view then the discipline 
is a science.  Alternatively if Tron theory co-exists in a significant way with the alternative 
theory following the new evidence then the discipline is composed of faith based and science 
based sub-disciplines.  Finally, if the alternative theory is either rejected or marginalised then 
we can conclude the discipline is based on faith alone. 
  
                                                 
5  See Dasgupta and David (1997) and Hands (2001) from the economics of science literature and Bloor’s (1991) 
‘strong programme’ within the sociology of scientific knowledge for explanations of why researchers 
faithfully adhere to empirically invalid assumptions and methodologies. 
 5 
This example suggests the following four axiomatic conditions for a discipline to be a science: 
C1. Only theories that conceptually provide empirically falsifiable predictions are relevant. 
C2. Theories are rejected in their current form when the predictions are empirically falsified. 
C3. If more than one theory produces empirically valid descriptions of the data then the 
dominant theory is the one where the assumptions better approximate in an empirical 
sense the focus of the assumption. 
C4. When an assumption of the theory is perfectly incorrect then the assumption along with 
the theory in its present form are rejected. 
C1 and C2 are a restatement of Popper (1959) in terms of what theories are scientific and the 
role of falsification in the evolution of theories.  In contrast, C3 and C4 focus on the assumptions 
to ensure they evolve in a way that is consistent with the ‘real’ world.   
The standard hypothesis testing procedure that underpins falsification in C2 focuses on whether 
or not the predictions (or forecasts) of a theory are correct.  For example, we might state a null 
hypothesis as the coefficient value predicted by a theory and then choose; (i) the test statistic; 
(ii) the distribution of the test statistic; and (iii) the level of significance for the test.  This allows 
the critical values and associated ‘reject’ and ‘non-reject’ regions of the decision rule to be 
identified.  Finally the test statistic is calculated from the estimated coefficient and the decision 
is made to either reject or not reject the null hypothesis. 
Unfortunately we cannot repeat this procedure when testing the null hypothesis that an 
assumption is correct.  This is because assumptions are mostly abstract concepts of what they 
are describing and so may be only approximately correct.  The test statistic that we need to 
calculate is one that measures how good the approximation is but this is undefined as it depends 
on the prior views of the theorist and is therefore in the ‘eye of the theorist’.  Therefore, as we 
cannot estimate the test statistic, its associated standard error, and we do not know the 
distribution of the test statistic, there is no objective test of whether an assumption is 
approximately correct. 
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C4 solves this problem by re-forming the null hypothesis as the assumption is perfectly 
incorrect where the latter is defined as never observed to be correct.  The corresponding test 
statistic is the proportion of times the assumption is observed to be correct and the rejection 
region of the decision rule is any non-zero value of the proportion.  Furthermore, as there is no 
measurement error around zero (either it is zero or it is not zero) there is no standard error of 
the estimate and so the distribution of the test statistic, its standard error and the appropriate 
level of significance are all irrelevant to the test.  If the test statistic is zero then we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the assumption is perfectly incorrect and the assumption is rejected.  
Alternatively, if the test statistic is non-zero then the assumption is approximately correct and 
whether it is a good approximation is undefined as it depends on the prior views of the theorist.6  
Finally, if the test statistic is 1 (i.e. the proportion is 1) the approximation is defined again as 
the assumption is perfectly correct in the sense that the assumption is always observed to be 
correct.  This framework for testing an assumption is shown in schematic Diagram 1. 
Underpinning C4 is the idea that any two theorists may not agree on how good an approximation 
an assumption is of ‘reality’ but they can agree on whether an assumption is never observed to 
be correct.  This means that a well-defined perfectly incorrect point on the decision rule is a 
valid and objective critical value for the rejection of an assumption.  To not reject the 
assumption when it is perfectly incorrect implies the theorist is faithfully retaining the 
assumption despite the empirical evidence that it is always observed to be incorrect.  In the 
same way that falsification in C2 leads to the rejection of a theory, the finding that an 
assumption is perfectly incorrect leads to the rejection of an assumption in C4. 
We sometimes observe in a ‘science’ based discipline an ‘old’ theory that contains a perfectly 
incorrect assumption continuing to be used and some might argue that this means C4 does not 
apply.  On the contrary, the continued use of an ‘old’ theory demonstrates that theories with 
perfectly incorrect assumptions are rejected.  This is because the usefulness of the old theory as 
a simple approximation of the new theory can only be understood from the perspective of the 
new theory.  If the old theory is found to be a poor approximation it will not continue to be 
used.  However, if the old theory is a good approximation of the new theory possibly over a 
                                                 
6  This implies there is no unique one-to-one mapping between the test statistic and the ‘goodness’ of the 
approximation for all theorists.  For example, if the test statistic is a proportion of 0.4 this may be a very good 
approximation for one theorist but a very poor approximation to another. 
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restricted range of conditions then the computational and theoretical simplicity of the old theory 
may mean that it has some advantage over the more elaborate new theory.  However, so that 
the new, and dominate, theory can be developed the assumption underpinning the old theory 
has first to be rejected.7  That is, C4 applies.  This issue is returned to briefly in Section 5. 
C4 can be explained with the following example.  Assume we wish to test an assumption that 
a box contains green apples.  In this case we are going down the left hand side of Diagram 1 as 
we can directly measure the test statistic of when the assumption is correct.  The null hypothesis 
is that the assumption is perfectly incorrect and that the box contains no green apples.  The test 
statistic is the proportion of green apples in the box and the decision rule contains three regions: 
perfectly incorrect when the proportion is zero, perfectly correct when 1, and approximately 
correct between 0 and 1.  The box is opened and the contents are observed (i.e. measured).  If 
there are no green apples in the box then we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the assumption 
is perfectly incorrect.  C4 then suggests that we should reject the assumption.8 
It may be that the perfectly incorrect point of the test statistic is not well-defined because of the 
form of the assumption or we cannot observe or measure directly when the assumption is 
correct.  In this case we may be able to transform the assumption into an associated prediction 
where the test statistic has a well-defined perfectly incorrect point and this allows an indirect 
‘test’ of the assumption.  This case is shown on the right hand side of Diagram 1.  For example, 
a theory may assume individuals are motivated by ‘X’ which cannot be measured directly and 
so the test statistic is undefined everywhere.  However, the motivation assumption may imply 
individuals behave in a way that can be observed and so the test statistic (i.e. the proportion of 
cases where the prediction is observed to be correct) is well defined allowing the null hypothesis 
that the prediction is perfectly incorrect to be tested.  If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
then the implied behaviour and the assumption are rejected simultaneously.  That is, if the 
implied behaviour is never observed we may conclude indirectly that the assumption of the 
                                                 
7  For example, Newtonian physics, Galileo’s law of falling objects, and Boyle-Charles’s law of ideal gases are 
three ‘old’ physics theories based on perfectly incorrect assumptions that continue to be used.  In each case 
the perfectly incorrect assumption has been rejected so that a new more elaborate theory is developed that 
allows us to understand when the old theory is a good approximation of the new theory. 
8  An alternative null hypothesis is the assumption is perfectly correct.  In this case if the test statistic is 1 then 
we cannot reject the alternative null hypothesis. 
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motivation of individuals is perfectly incorrect.  Note that the reverse does not follow.  If the 
implied behaviour is observed we cannot conclude the assumption is correct as the implied 
behaviour may also be consistent with an alternative assumption.9  The ‘testing’ of an 
assumption by its transformation into the implied behaviour of agents is used in Section 4 to 
examine some of the behavioural assumptions of ‘modern’ theories of the Phillips curve. 
Return now to C4 which states that when an assumption is observed to be perfectly incorrect it 
is rejected.  It is C4 that is critical in the evolution of scientific theories as it allows the discipline 
to focus on what is incorrect with the existing theory and encourages improvement specifically 
in that area.  If the assumptions are not rejected when identified as perfectly incorrect then time 
is wasted building theories based on the empirically invalid assumptions instead of developing 
and exploring alternative empirically valid assumptions.  Note that it is the empirical analysis 
of C2 and C4 that provides a ‘real’ anchor for the evolution of theories both in terms of 
improved prediction of the data and stopping theories from evolving along the lines of notional 
assumptions that are only valid in the imagination of the theorist. 
The conditions allow for the co-existence of rival theories.10  This is due in part to the 
falsification in C2 being subject to the Duhem–Quine problem that any test of a hypothesis 
depends on a number of ancillary assumptions that may or may not be true.11  Therefore, a 
rejection of the hypothesis may be due to either the hypothesis or the ancillary assumptions 
being false.12  However, if we believe the ancillary assumptions of the test are logically correct 
and not themselves empirically invalid then falsification can occur conditional on the ancillary 
assumptions being ‘agreed’ to be correct. 
The co-existence of theories is also allowed under C3 because there is no one-to-one mapping 
between the assumptions and the approximation as argued above.  However, if the assumption 
                                                 
9  Note also that when rejecting the implied behaviour of assumption X we are simultaneously rejecting all 
assumptions that generate the same implied behaviour. 
10  Two theories are co-existing if the theories are based on different methodologies and assumptions and seek 
to explain the same outcome and the assumptions of both theories are approximately correct.  Co-existence 
does not apply if one theory is a simplification (i.e. a restricted version) of the other. 
11  It may be that the predictions cannot be tested given available technology.  This allows the co-existence of 
rival theories until technology improves when C2, C3 and C4 apply. 
12  See Gillies (1998). 
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(or the transformed prediction) is not rejected when observed in only 3 per cent of cases the 
theorist would look somewhat ‘non-scientifically’ attached to the assumption especially if the 
alternative assumption is observed in 80 per cent of cases.13 
The hypothetical ‘sun discipline’ example above mirrors numerous examples in the physical, 
chemical, medical and biological sciences where the predictions of the competing theories are 
identical and so cannot be used to distinguish between the theories.  In these cases the 
competition is often resolved with the advent of empirical evidence that a ‘model defining’ 
assumption underpinning one of the theories is found to be invalid or ‘perfectly incorrect’ in 
the terminology used above.  For example, Miasma theory persisted for many centuries and 
explained the spread of diseases such as cholera and the plague by miasma or ‘bad air’.14  This 
theory is scientific in the sense of Popper and consistent with the data in that it explains the 
spread of disease.  However, from 1546 when Italian physician Girolamo Fracastoro suggested 
that diseases were transferred between people by small spores an alternative theory of the spread 
of diseases existed which was also consistent with the data.  The alternative theory was 
eventually accepted as valid in the mid to late 19th Century when improved technology allowed 
the identification of germs as the carriers of disease and Miasma theory was rejected.  Of course 
the medical profession could have argued that disease spread ‘as if’ by miasma but this would 
have violated C4 indicating medicine was a faith based discipline and not a science.15  
Furthermore, if medicine had persisted with Miasma theory one may hypothesise how this 
would have hindered (or stopped) all the developments that followed the discovery of germs 
and the necessary rejection of Miasma theory. 
                                                 
13  The philosophy of science when examining how science is organised, undertaken and progresses provides 
some understanding of why rival theories co-exist under C2 and C3.  For example see Kuhn (1970), Lakatos 
(1978), Bloor (1991), Dasgupta and David (1994), Bird (1998) and Hands (2001). 
14  A more contemporary example that has not yet reached a conclusion is the alternative theories underpinning 
symmetry breaking in the standard model of particle physics.  The Higgs field and associated boson is one of 
a number of theories that explains symmetry breaking and this theory received considerable support following 
the identification of a particle using the Large Hadron Collider on 4 July 2012 which was shown subsequently 
to have many characteristics in common with the Higgs boson. 
15  In this case Miasma theory from the perspective of ‘germ theory’ is a poor approximation of the latter and so 
does not continue to be used. 
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3. EMPIRICAL VALIDITY OF THE ‘MODERN’ THEORIES OF THE PHILLIPS CURVE 
In this section we consider the empirical validity of the ‘modern’ theories of the Phillips curve 
to examine if macroeconomics conforms with C1 and C2.  ‘Modern’ theories of the Phillips 
curve can be thought of in terms of restrictions to the hybrid Phillips curve: 
 𝜋𝑡 =  𝛿 +  𝛿𝑓𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+1) +  𝛿𝑏𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝜇𝜇𝑡 +  𝜖𝑡 (1) 
where inflation, t , depends on expected inflation,  1ttE  , conditioned on information 
available at time t , lagged inflation, 1t , and a ‘forcing’ variable, 𝜇𝑡.  In the F-P Phillips curve 
0f  and 1b  and agents are purely backward looking with adaptive expectations.  At the 
other extreme, the NK Phillips Curve of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Svensson (2000) 
agents are purely forward-looking with rational expectations and df  1  and 0b  where 
d  is the discount rate.  Finally, in the hybrid models of Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler 
and Lopez-Salido (2001) agents are both backward and forward looking and dbf  1 .  
The F-P theory predicts the dynamic inflation terms sum to one while in the NK theory the 
coefficient on expected inflation is the discount rate.  However, the empirical NK literature 
largely ignores this and considers the sum of the dynamic inflation terms to be one.  For 
simplicity of exposition the sum of the coefficients on the dynamic inflation terms is assumed 
to be one in the NK and hybrid models unless otherwise stated. 
The ‘modern’ theories predict that inflation is an integrated or near integrated process as 𝛿𝑓 +
 𝛿𝑏 is either 1 or approximately 1.  This prediction has a number of important shortcomings.  
One, the statistical process of inflation in the ‘modern’ theories is due to the characteristics of 
agents.  In the F-P model the dynamic terms sum to one because agents hold adaptive 
expectations while in the NK model the coefficient on expected inflation is the discount rate of 
agents.  This is contrary to standard monetary theory where long-run inflation is determined by 
the behaviour of central banks partly in response to the shocks experienced by the economy. 
Two, if inflation is an integrated process as in the F-P theory then central banks accommodate 
all shocks and hold no target rate of inflation.  The implications for central banks from the NK 
theory are similarly unbelievable.  If households and firms are risk neutral, face a symmetrical 
loss function in the region of the optimum price and their expectations about future prices are 
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rational and unbiased then assuming a real annual interest rate of four per cent the quarterly 
value of 𝛿𝑓 is of the order of 0.99.  This implies that the mean adjustment lag in the NK theory 
to a shock to inflation is around 25 years which on a practical level implies that central banks 
again do not hold a target rate of inflation.16  Note that this conclusion does not apply to any 
one central bank but applies to central banks of every country at all times in history.  To argue 
that central banks never hold a target rate of inflation is hard to sustain.17  Furthermore, it is 
hard to accept that central bankers are entirely passive players in the inflationary process and 
by implication drawing salaries for not running monetary policy.18 
Three, given the willingness of firms to diversify to offset risk, it is likely that firms are risk 
averse and not risk neutral.  In the NK model this implies that 𝛿𝑓 = 1 − 𝑑 − 𝜏 where 𝜏 > 0 is 
a risk premium that is monotonically increasing with uncertainty.  That is, due to risk aversion, 
uncertainty about the future leads firms to discount the future by more than if they were risk 
neutral.  Now assume two periods.  In the first inflation is an integrated process (i.e. 𝛿𝑓 = 1) 
and in the second inflation is low, stable and a stationary process with low persistence (i.e. 𝛿𝑓 
is small and less than one).  The characteristics of the first period imply the risk premium 𝜏 is 
large due to high uncertainty concerning the long-run rate of inflation.  In contrast, in the second 
period uncertainty is low and 𝜏 is small.  This means that in the NK theory 𝛿𝑓 = 1 − 𝑑 − 𝜏 is 
small when inflation is an integrated process and large when inflation is low, stable and a 
stationary process which contradicts the initial assumptions concerning the statistical processes 
of inflation where 𝛿𝑓 = 1 when integrated and 𝛿𝑓 is small and less than 1 when stationary. 
Four, inflation cannot be a ‘truly’ integrated process as it appears to have an upper boundary at 
some moderate rate and a lower boundary around zero in the developed world.19  The problem 
                                                 
16  Calculated as 𝛿𝑓 (1 − 𝛿𝑓) = 0.99 (1 − 0.99) =⁄  99⁄  quarters or approximately 25 years. 
17  Note the concept of the ‘Volker deflation’ at the start of the 1980s is misplaced as it implies the Governor of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of America targeted a lower rate of inflation which would be out of his control if 
inflation is an integrated process. 
18  It is ironic that the NK theory is so popular in central banks given what it implies about the behaviour of 
central bankers. 
19  While some economies have experienced periods of positive hyperinflation there has not been any recorded 
instance of an economy experiencing negative hyperinflation.  It may be that 10,000 years of recorded history 
is insufficient time to conclude the probability of negative hyperinflation is zero but it appears a ‘reasonable’ 
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for both the F-P and NK theories is that they predict ‘inflation is always and everywhere an 
integrated phenomenon’.20  Consequently, both theories argue that the statistical processes of 
inflation is a singleton set containing only the element that inflation is an integrated process.21  
This implies that when inflation is a stationary process (which it may have been since the early 
1990s) then both the F-P and NK theories are invalid empirical descriptions of the data.  The 
only way the ‘modern’ theories can be consistent with the data is if we believe that inflation 
cannot, is not, and can never be a stationary process at any time in history and in any country.  
If we are unwilling to accept this belief then we must be equally unwilling to accept the 
‘modern’ theories of the Phillips curve as a general description of inflation. 
Five, some observers may argue that the F-P or NK theories are correct but there is a missing 
equation such as a Taylor Rule that describes the behaviour of the central bank.22  If the Taylor 
Rule dominates then inflation is a stationary process around the central bank’s target rate of 
inflation and 𝛿𝑓 +  𝛿𝑏 must be less than 1 by the definition of stationarity.  Alternatively, if 
either the F-P or NK theories are correct and agents dominate the inflationary process then the 
Taylor Rule is redundant and conceptually incorrect.  Given inflation is not an integrated 
process then we might conclude that the central bank dominants the F-P and NK agents in the 
inflationary process implying the ‘modern’ Phillips curve theories are conceptually incorrect. 
Six, while inflation is unlikely to be an integrated process it is likely to have been non-stationary 
over the past fifty years in the developed world.  To argue the converse that inflation is 
stationary (with a constant mean) implies (i) there has only been one long-run and expected rate 
of inflation; (ii) one short-run Phillips curve; (iii) the original Phillips (1958) curve did not 
break down with changes in expected inflation at the end of the 1960s; and (iv) the long-run 
Phillips curve is a single combination of the long-run rates of inflation and unemployment.  
Furthermore, if inflation is a stationary process then all the ‘modern’ theories of the Phillips 
                                                 
conclusion given available information.  In any case, given price adjustments are in discrete units, negative 
hyperinflation would conceptually disappear once the price level quickly hits the lower bound of zero. 
20  This paraphrases Milton Friedman famous quotation from his Wincott Memorial Lecture delivered in London 
on 16 September 1970. 
21  The bounded nature of inflation is reinforced by what it implies for the price level.  If inflation is an integrated 
process of order 1 then the price level is integrated of order 2 which cannot be correct because prices by 
definition are non-negative and therefore bounded at zero. 
22  See Taylor’s (1993) seminal article and the extensive ‘Taylor Rule’ resources on his personal web site. 
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curve since and including F-P are empirically irrelevant as there has been no change in the 
expected rates of inflation.  Unless we are comfortable with these implications of inflation as a 
stationary process we must conclude that inflation is a non-stationary process. 
What then is the likely statistical process of inflation?  ‘Modern’ theories of the Phillips curve 
argue that with no change in monetary policy and with mean zero inflationary shocks then 
inflation will vary around the long-run rate of inflation.  A change in monetary policy results in 
inflation converging on and varying around a new long-run rate of inflation.  We might 
therefore expect that inflation is a stationary process around a shifting mean.  The latter is due 
to changes in monetary policy and allows for the numerous expected rates of inflation that are 
central to all the ‘modern’ theories of the Phillips curve since Friedman (1968) and Phelps 
(1967).  If inflation is a stationary process around a shifting mean then the unit root commonly 
found in inflation data has no behavioural relevance and is simply due to not accounting for the 
structural breaks in mean inflation when testing for a unit root.23 
Seven, Russell (2011), Russell et al. (2011) and Russell and Chowdhury (2013) estimate 
Phillips curves similar to equation (1) using around fifty years of quarterly United States 
inflation data.  They demonstrate that if the shifts in mean inflation are not accounted for in the 
estimation then the standard results of the ‘modern’ Phillips curve literature can be retrieved.  
This is equivalent to assuming inflation is stationary with a constant mean.  However, once the 
shifts in mean inflation are allowed for when estimating the models then there is no significant 
empirical evidence in favour of any of the ‘modern’ theories of the Phillips curve.24  
Importantly, there is also no significant evidence supporting the role of the model defining 
expected rate of inflation in the NK and hybrid theories of the inflation.  It appears that the 
finding in the standard literature that the dynamic inflation terms sum to one simply reflects the 
unaccounted shifts in mean inflation when estimating the Phillips curve.  This finding is not 
                                                 
23  Perron (1989) argues that stationary processes with breaks are easily mistaken for integrated processes. 
24  For example, columns 4 and 5 in Table 2 of Russell and Chowdhury (2013) report that the forward inflation 
term, 𝛿𝑓, is insignificantly different from zero.  Table 6 reports that when 𝛿𝑓 is restricted to zero in the 
estimated model then the estimated value of the backward inflation term, 𝛿𝑏, is 0.2431 and strongly 
significant.  The latter conforms with the statistical process consistent Phillips curve that they propose. 
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logically troubling once it is accepted that inflation is a stationary process around a shifting 
mean as the absolute value of 𝛿𝑓 + 𝛿𝑏 must be less than one by the definition of stationarity. 
And finally eight, the behaviour of agents in the ‘modern’ theories is questionable.  These agents 
are very sophisticated and well informed so as to undertake the highly complicated optimising 
processes in the theories.  It is therefore illogical to believe that such sophisticated and well 
informed agents would make the systematic error (more importantly the permanent error) of 
thinking that inflation is always and everywhere an integrated process given the bounded nature 
of inflation. 
In summary the prediction of the ‘modern’ Phillips curve theories that inflation is an integrated 
process is hard to sustain.  This prediction appears at the end of the 1960s with Friedman (1968) 
and Phelps (1967) and has not been rejected on empirical grounds even though (i) inflation 
appears bounded, and (ii) the rhetorical underpinning of the theories themselves suggest 
inflation is a stationary process around periodic shifts in mean due to changes in monetary 
policy.  The failure to empirically falsify the F-P model and reject the basic stylised fact that 
inflation is an integrated process means that the objective of subsequent theories of the Phillips 
curve has been to explain the incorrect ‘stylised fact’ that inflation is integrated.  Consequently, 
while we can say that the ‘modern’ theories of the Phillips curve are scientific and meet 
condition C1 the macroeconomics discipline has consistently violated condition C2 in not 
rejecting an obviously invalid prediction of the ‘modern’ theories of the Phillips curve.  In a 
real sense macroeconomic ‘theory’ has come to dominate and ignore empirical reality for an 
extended period of time. 
4. EXAMINING THE MODEL DEFINING UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 
In this section we make use of the perfectly incorrect point of the test statistic to examine three 
model defining assumptions of the ‘modern’ Phillips curve theories and see if the 
macroeconomics discipline conforms with C4. 
4.1 Marginal Costs equal Marginal Revenues 
The advent of marginal analysis in the mid to late 19th Century by Jevons (1871), Menger (1871) 
and Walras (1874-77) appeared to solve how firms set, or take, prices and choose the level of 
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output.25  Since then ‘acceptable’ macroeconomic models assume firms maximise profits 
requiring marginal costs to equal marginal revenues.  The profit maximising solution is 
relatively straightforward in theoretical models given the underlying assumptions concerning 
the abilities of the agents, available information and the form of the production function.  
However in practice marginal costs and revenues are not just difficult to measure they are 
undefined.26 
Marginal costs are undefined as all output is a joint product of the labour, non-labour and capital 
inputs.27  That is, all outputs have at least one input that simultaneously produces more than one 
output.28  Examples of how inputs produce joint products include (i) managers of a car plant 
producing more than one model of car; (ii) sales assistants in a supermarket selling more than 
one product; (iii) a lamb slaughtered to produce a number of cuts of meat; (iv) a lathe in a 
workshop producing a range of metal items; and (v) the cost of electricity and cleaning products 
in a warehouse storing many lines of chocolates and other sweets. 
There are three forms of joint products.  The first are the joint products of labour where there 
is no clear delineation between fixed and variable costs.  This simple but insightful observation 
is the basis of much of Kalecki’s work.29  He recognises there is a category of labour that does 
not change with small changes in output which he terms ‘overhead’ labour and should be treated 
                                                 
25  Discussing marginal costs and revenues makes it appear the argument is straying into microeconomics.  
However, the ‘accepted methodology’ of modern macroeconomics is to use optimising micro-foundations 
which assume profit maximising firms where marginal costs equal marginal revenues. 
26  Turvey (2000) argues marginal costs can only be calculated using forecasted changes in costs and for a 
substantial change in output.  Consequently while the concept of marginal cost may be agreed between 
economists, in practice the calculation requires an agreed set of rules.  Taking Turvey’s argument to its logical 
conclusion this implies there are as many measures of marginal costs as there are infinite sets of rules and 
therefore marginal costs are undefined.  See also Turvey (1969). 
27  There is a long literature on the concept of joint products.  Important early work includes Marshall (1920, 
1927) and Sraffa (1960), and more recently Baumol (1976, 1977), Panzar and Willig (1977) and Willig 
(1979). 
28  Some observers may feel that arguing all products are joint outputs is an exaggeration and cite single output 
firms such as water and electricity utilities as counter-examples.  However, while these firms appear to have 
only one output, in practice the supply of the output differs by geographic location.  Consider two end-users 
‘a’ and ‘b’ and the supply network passes ‘a’ to service ‘b’.  In this case the marginal depreciation costs of 
the network before ‘a’ need to be apportioned to both ‘a’ and ‘b’ which is not uniquely defined implying 
marginal costs are undefined even with these apparently single output firms. 
29  For example see Kalecki (1954, 1971). 
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as a part of fixed costs.  For example, the number of managers, cleaners and security guards do 
not change with small increases in output.  Therefore there are as many measures of marginal 
costs as there are delineations between variable and overhead labour available to the firm. 
The second form is the joint products of non-labour inputs.  Consider, a lamb that produces a 
range of joint products including legs of lamb and lamb cutlets.  What is the marginal cost of a 
leg of lamb?  If the lamb is slaughtered for a single leg then the marginal cost is very high.  If 
a range of products is produced from the slaughtered lamb then the marginal cost is lower.  The 
marginal cost depends on how the cost of the lamb (as well as the costs of the person who 
slaughters the lamb, depreciation and other input costs) is apportioned to the individual outputs. 
The third form is the joint product of capital.  Leaving aside how we delineate between capital 
and non-capital inputs, marginal costs should include a charge for the ‘true’ depreciation of 
fixed capital.  Consider again the example of slaughtering the lamb.  The marginal cost of the 
leg of lamb should include the actual cost of the accelerated depreciation of the equipment 
involved in the production process and this is not just a simple engineering problem to 
determine.  A single cut with the knife may split the lamb into a leg and the remainder.  How 
the accelerated depreciation due to the cut is apportioned between the leg and the remainder 
affects the marginal cost of the leg of lamb. 
Apportioning the joint costs in the above three examples to the marginal cost of a product can 
follow many ‘rules’.  For example, the costs could be apportioned in the ratio of the prices of 
the outputs or the ratio of the sales revenues generated by the outputs.  As there is an infinite 
number of cost apportioning rules there must be an infinite number of measures of marginal 
costs and therefore the marginal cost of a product is not defined. 
We turn now to how the discrete nature of production and sales also renders marginal costs and 
revenues undefined.  What is the marginal cost of producing one extra unit of a car?  The answer 
depends, in part, on the time period involved.  The marginal cost of one car per year will be 
different from one car per quarter, month, week, day, eight hour shift, hour, minute, or second.  
The time period involved will determine if the firm needs to employ more labour, capital, or 
even change the production process.  Marginal costs depend on an arbitrary choice of time 
period.  Similarly the marginal revenue for the sale of one more car depends on the time period 
being considered.  When production is discrete and not continuous as in macroeconomic theory, 
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the measures of marginal costs and revenues depends on the time period involved and as the 
time period is not defined uniquely then marginal costs and revenues are again undefined. 
It follows therefore, that firms cannot calculate unique ‘true’ measures of marginal costs and 
revenues.  Each measure depends on assumptions concerning the time period and how to 
allocate costs to joint products.  It follows therefore that marginal costs and revenues are 
undefined and the assumption that marginal costs equal marginal revenues in equilibrium is 
perfectly incorrect. 
4.2 The Business Cycle is due to Mistaken Inflation Expectations 
In the Friedman and Phelps expectations augmented Phillips curve the business cycle is driven 
by mistakes made by labour (the asymmetric information assumption) concerning the expected 
rate of inflation and the subsequent correction to those mistakes (adaptive expectations).  These 
fundamental assumptions help define the F-P theory of the Phillips curve but are unobservable 
and therefore the test statistic and decision rule to reject the assumptions are undefined 
everywhere.  However, taken together these two model defining assumptions make very strong 
predictions about the behaviour of agents that can be examined empirically.  For example, if 
we start in long-run equilibrium the dynamics of inflation over the business cycle begins with 
a loosening in monetary policy leading labour to make mistakes concerning the relationship 
between actual and expected inflation.  Due to the asymmetric information assumption labour 
mistakenly believe the real wage has increased while firms (making no mistakes) correctly 
understand the real wage has decreased.  Consequently labour supplies more labour because of 
their mistake and firms are happy to employ them.  The business cycle draws to an end because 
labour corrects their mistakes by way of adaptive expectations leading the real wage to return 
to its long-run level along with employment, unemployment and output. 
The difficulty for the F-P model is that empirically the behaviour implied by these underlying 
assumptions is not observed.  First, while mainly unskilled labour enters employment at the 
start of the business cycle and leaves at the end, it is not the exact same labour.  Consistency 
demands that if individual ‘a’ makes the initial mistake it should be individual ‘a’ who leaves 
once they correct their mistake.  It cannot be (as appears to be the case) that when individual 
‘a’ makes the mistake at the start of the business cycle individual ‘b’ leaves employment at the 
end when the mistake is corrected. 
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Second, this author is unaware of any instance either anecdotal or recorded in the literature 
whereby someone has explained to their employer and others that their decision to quit their 
employment was due to their surprise at how high prices are.30  This is not the same as quitting 
because real wages are unexpectedly low due to an unexpectedly low nominal wage but the real 
wage is low because prices are unexpectedly high.31 
Third, measuring the business cycle in terms of ten to twenty years is inconsistent with how 
highly sophisticated and information rich the agents are that populate the F-P theory.  Such 
clever agents should ‘wise-up’ and correct their mistaken price expectations much quicker than 
the length of the business cycle.  For the business cycle to persist for the time that is common 
in the data would require repeated unanticipated loosening of monetary policy through the 
entire business cycle.  This would allow labour to mistakenly believe the real wage has 
systematically risen so as to continue to supply the extra labour for the length of the business 
cycle.  But we see no such systematic increases in mean, or long-run, rates of inflation over the 
business cycle.  On the contrary, the standard empirical Phillips curve literature proceeds on 
the assumption of up to a maximum of 3 breaks in the mean rate of inflation (i.e. only three 
changes in monetary policy) over the past five decades in the United States.  Of these three 
breaks one or possibly two are associated with a loosening in monetary policy.  Sophisticated 
agents are unlikely to be ‘fooled’ for long by such infrequent changes in policy and having 
corrected their mistakes bring the business cycle to an end well before periods of ten to twenty 
years. 
One might argue the problem is the form of the asymmetric information assumption.  The Lucas 
(1973) ‘surprise’ aggregate supply function makes the reverse assumption that firms and not 
labour make the mistakes.  Unfortunately the implied behaviour in this model is equally 
implausible.  In this model, a person enters a shop offering $1.05 for a loaf of bread with a price 
tag of $1.  The manager recognises this as a ‘surprise’ in the sense that the manager cannot 
disentangle the offered higher price between an idiosyncratic increase in the demand for bread 
                                                 
30  There appears to be no evidence that the reverse behaviour occurs as an economy begins to expand after 
passing the trough of a recession.  That is, there is no record of anyone ever explaining their re-found desire 
for employment as due to the unexpectedly low level of prices (i.e. the real wage is unexpectedly high). 
31  I would like to hear from any reader who can document an incident whereby a person has quit their 
employment and (unprompted) explains their decision with reference to their ‘surprise’ concerning the high 
level of prices. 
 19 
from their shop and a general increase in the price level due to a loosening in monetary policy.  
If it is the former the manager should increase the quantity of bread sold but if the later then 
only one loaf of bread should be sold.  Given the confusion, the manager sells one loaf of bread, 
and on opening another loaf, hands over two more slices of bread.  Consequently, the mistaken 
price expectations of the firm have led to an increase in the quantity of bread sold.  This 
behaviour is as absurd as that implied by the F-P model and suggests it is not mistaken price 
expectations by either labour or firms that drive the business cycle.  We can therefore conclude 
the predictions based on the behavioural assumption that the business cycle is driven by 
mistaken price expectations are perfectly incorrect.  And it follows therefore that the 
assumptions are also perfectly incorrect. 
4.3 Agents are Forward Looking 
In some ways the NK literature is a response to the strange and unseen behaviour implied by 
the price-taking F-P model outlined in the previous section.  The initial richness of the NK 
model is that firms set prices which coincides with the observed behaviour of firms.  However, 
the optimising forward looking behaviour by households and firms in the NK theory introduces 
its own set of implausible and unseen behaviour.  In particular the optimisation of consumption 
in the NK theory requires: (i) the inter-temporal consumption elasticity of substitution to be a 
positive non-zero number; (ii) agents can price all future unknown products; and (iii) agents 
can predict all changes in future relative prices.  Each of these requirements are necessary 
conditions for agents to optimise their consumption over time as in the NK theory and we 
consider each in turn. 
4.3.1 The inter-temporal consumption elasticity of substitution 
In the NK theory agents optimise their consumption over time and within each time period.  For 
this to be possible it is necessary for the motivation of the consumption in the future to be 
transferred over time.  For example, consider the infinitely lived households that optimise 
consumption over an infinite time horizon.  Imagine the representative household sees the 
relative price of a particular model of a car increases ten years into the future.  The implication 
is the household responds by buying more ‘car’ now in period t.  But this implies a car now is 
a substitute for a car in ten years’ time which it cannot be because you need a new car in ten 
years’ time.  To be a substitute the motivation for consuming the car in 10 years’ time must be 
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transferable to buying a car in period t.  If this is not possible then the price elasticity of 
substitution between periods t and t+10 is zero.   
This argument can be explained by considering oranges and lemons which may be considered 
substitutes in the same period.  The motivation for consuming both of these citrus fruits is based 
on their similar taste and the need for calories and vitamins.  An increase in the relative price 
of lemons will lead to an increase in the demand for oranges as the motivation for consuming 
lemons transfers to consuming oranges.  Now consider the case where the agent is mortally 
allergic to oranges.  In this case the motivation cannot transfer to oranges and therefore oranges 
are not a substitute for lemons no matter how the relative price of lemons changes.  In the same 
way, an increase in the relative price of a car in 10 years’ time does not lead to an increase in 
the demand for cars today because the motivation for buying the car in 10 years’ time is the 
desire for a new car and not a 10 year old car.  If people do optimise their consumption decisions 
over time as in the NK theory then we should frequently hear people explain their consumption 
habits today by saying they are buying ‘more’ or ‘less’ today because the price of the substitute 
in the future is high or low.  This inter-temporal behaviour is almost never observed in agents 
and when observed it is for a very special (and very small) sub-set of economic decisions. 
One might ask what the sub-set is and in particular over what time horizon agents might 
substitute their consumption.  From the discussion above it depends on how many periods the 
motivation can be transferred and the product can be stored in the same condition as when 
purchased in the future.  For example, you may need a cheese sandwich for a business lunch in 
10 days’ time.  Even if the sandwich was free today it is unlikely that you will purchase the 
sandwich today because it will spoil before it is needed.  While a car purchased today may be 
approximately in the same condition as one purchased in one months’ time it is not the same as 
a new car in ten years’ time. 
4.3.2 Forecasting the price of unknown products 
To optimise consumption over time agents must be able to forecast the future price of unknown 
products and this is, at best, fanciful.  Consider the car example again.  The design, make and 
content of the car ten years in the future are unknown even to the manufacturer today.  Also 
unknown are the specifications of all competing cars and substitute forms of travel which 
depend on how technology and taste will evolve over time.  Assuming the price of cars is partly 
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related to the services they provide then it is not possible for a household to identify a price of 
a car with unknown characteristics among a lexicography of unknown of forms of travel. 
4.3.3 Agents predicting structural breaks 
For agents to optimise their consumption and other economic decisions over time they need to 
be able to predict changes in relative prices.  To do this an agent must be able to predict the 
structural breaks in the mean price inflation for every product.  Assume that for N periods the 
price inflation of good 1, ∆𝑝1, is stationary with a constant mean.  If agents can predict the 
future shift in mean in period N-k this implies inflation in the last k periods will start to adjust 
to the new mean and will have a different mean to the first N-k periods.  This contradicts our 
initial assumption that inflation has a constant mean for all N periods and so we can conclude 
that agents cannot predict the impending shift in mean inflation. 
Return now to agents optimising over the future.  In the NK theory agents are forward looking 
in their economic decisions and to do this they need to be able to predict changes in relative 
prices.  This requires agents to be able to predict the structural breaks in the mean rates of 
inflation of each and every product.  However, as argued above, agents cannot logically predict 
structural breaks in the mean rates of inflation and therefore logically we can conclude that 
agents are not forward looking in the sense used in the NK theory.  This does not mean agents 
do not want to know the future only that they are unable to predict the structural breaks so that 
they can undertake the forward looking optimising behaviour underpinning the NK theory.  In 
important ways the unknown future is exactly that, unknown.32 
The reader can test if they conform to the NK theory of optimising consumption by asking how 
often they give any consideration to future prices when undertaking the myriad of transactions 
every day.  The lack of any consideration is partly because of the inability to transfer the 
motivation across time periods; partly due to the difficulty in predicting the characteristics of 
unknown future goods and services; and partly due to the inability to identify changes in relative 
                                                 
32  Caballero (2010) asserts ‘real people’ do not have the skills and the information to undertake the optimising 
behaviour attributed to agents by ‘core’ macroeconomists.  However, as argued above it is logical that agents 
cannot predict the structural breaks in mean inflation and therefore there is a logical empirical basis to 
Caballero’s assertion. 
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prices when inflation is a stationary process around a shifting mean.  At first the reader may 
think of some very special cases, possibly over very short time horizons, where predicted future 
prices are thought relevant.  However, to optimise consumption over time as in the NK theory 
requires agents to hold predictions of all future prices and relative prices out to the infinite time 
horizon (including prices of unknown products) and not just a very small sub-set of prices.  
Unless the reader believes agents hold these predictions it is necessary to accept that agents do 
not have the necessary information to optimise consumption as in the NK theory. 
In summary, it appears the three underlying assumptions of the F-P and NK models considered 
above are very poor approximations of actual behaviour.  First, marginal costs and revenues are 
undefined and therefore the assumption that they are equal in equilibrium is perfectly incorrect.  
Second, the model defining assumptions of both the F-P and NK models also appear to be 
perfectly incorrect in that the implied behaviour of agents is never observed in the F-P theory 
and converges on never being observed in the NK theory when considered from the perspective 
of an infinite time horizon.  Finally, the idea that agents possess the information concerning all 
prices of unknown future products and structural breaks in price inflation that is necessary so 
that agents are forward looking in the way assumed in the NK theory is logically indefensible 
and therefore perfectly incorrect. 
5. THE ‘AS IF’ DEFENCE 
An economic theorist may argue that ‘we know firms and agents do not actually behave in the 
way we model them but we can model them ‘as if’ they behave in this way’.  The clearest 
exposition of this argument is Friedman (1953).  He begins by asserting that how well a model 
predicts is the best test of a theory.  He then proceeds to give the example of an object dropped 
in a vacuum will travel a distance given by Galileo’s Law of Falling Bodies with the formula 
2
2
1
tgs   where 𝑠 is the distance travelled, 𝑔 is the acceleration due to gravity, and 𝑡 is the 
time elapsed.  This theory is tested repeatedly and accepted if not rejected by the data.  
Importantly, Friedman states that this does not mean that the model assumes a vacuum but that 
‘bodies that fall in the actual atmosphere behave as if they are falling in a vacuum’.33  Friedman 
                                                 
33  Friedman (1953) page 18. 
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acknowledges that this formula is inaccurate in some circumstances such as using a feather 
instead of a ball but that the model is accepted because it successfully predicts the distance 
travelled by a ball when dropped. 
Friedman’s argument is a miss-representation of Popper (1959) and confuses the test of the 
theory (i.e. falsification) with the objective of the theory.  If the objective of the theory is to 
explain some aspect of the real world so that we can study a range of policies then the ‘as if’ 
argument is less satisfying.  For example, a government may approach the theorist and ask how 
to make a ball travel at a velocity other than that predicted by the formula above.  The researcher 
who accepts the theory should respond by saying that nothing can be done as the model predicts 
all objects fall as if in a vacuum.  However, we know that the vacuum assumption is perfectly 
incorrect and a theory that rejects this assumption and models the wind resistance of the falling 
object can be used to provide the policy answer. 
Galileo’s Law of Falling Bodies continues to be used in circumstances where the vacuum 
assumption is perfectly incorrect.  However, how good an approximation Galileo’s Law is in 
describing how objects fall can only be understood from the perspective of a theory that 
incorporates the wind resistance of the object which in turn required the perfectly incorrect 
vacuum assumption to be rejected.  In other words C4 applies even though Galileo’s Law of 
Falling Bodies continues to be used in a restricted range of circumstances because of its 
computational and theoretical simplicity.  If theorists had invoked the ‘as if’ defence and had 
faithfully adhered to the vacuum assumption then a fuller theory containing wind resistance 
would not have evolved along with all the developments that follow from understanding wind 
resistance. 
A corresponding macroeconomics example is to model the business cycle ‘as if’ it is driven by 
mistaken price expectations as in the F-P theory.  If a government asked for policy advice 
concerning how to offset a large and prolonged decline in output the advisor should answer 
‘you have to get agents to correct their mistakes by loosening monetary policy’ or ‘there is 
nothing that can be done in practice as we have to wait for the optimising agents to correct their 
mistaken price expectations’.  However, this advice is based on a ‘perfectly incorrect’ 
assumption that the business cycle is driven by mistaken price expectations and so the policy 
advice is as empty of any relevance as policy advice based on the vacuum assumption in the 
example above. 
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The difficulty with the ‘as if’ argument is that it violates C4 above and the modelling process 
loses the ‘real’ anchor of the empirical analysis of the data.34  It means that any notional 
assumption becomes valid allowing theories to diverge from describing the ‘real’ world to 
describing the imaginary world of the theorist.  Furthermore, if any particular perfectly incorrect 
notional assumption becomes entrenched then the theory fails to evolve at all. 
6. IS MACROECONOMICS A SCIENCE? 
We can consider the macroeconomics discipline in terms of the four conditions set out above.  
C1 appears valid as only theories that provide empirically falsifiable predictions are in general 
considered relevant.35  However, as demonstrated in Section 3 it appears that dominant 
macroeconomic theories can persist for an extended period of time even though the predictions 
at an aggregate level are not consistent with the data.  For example, the F-P theory evolved 
through new classical macroeconomics, real business cycle theories to the NK theory with the 
discipline not rejecting the prediction in all these theories that inflation is an integrated process 
even though inflation is very unlikely to be ‘truly’ integrated as argued above.  Consequently, 
we might conclude that the macroeconomics discipline pays little attention to C2 even when 
the empirical evidence is very strong and straightforward. 
Over the past eighty years macroeconomics has evolved from that of Keynes (1936), through 
Hicks/Hansen’s IS/LM, Paul Samuelson’s neo-classical synthesis, Friedman’s Monetarism, 
Lucas/Sargent/Wallace/Prescott’s New Classical Macroeconomics, Kydland/Prescott’s Real 
Business Cycle to the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) technique and the New 
Keynesian theory.  The evolution occurred in steps of various sizes and is thought to reflect 
scientific progress.36  Importantly the progress has mostly followed a period of intense 
                                                 
34  When a theorist invokes the ‘as if’ defence they simultaneously reveal they believe the assumption in perfectly 
incorrect.  Otherwise the theorist would argue the empirical validity of the assumption is either unknown 
(because we cannot measure it), or approximately correct, or actually correct.  A theorist would not willingly 
use the ‘as if’ defence unless all other justifications for the assumption have been exhausted.  Consequently 
we can think of the ‘as if’ defence as the last refuge of a faith based theorist. 
35  The possible exception is the DSGE technique which is often mistakenly referred to as a ‘theory’.  See Section 
7 below. 
36  The term ‘progress’ is used loosely here to describe time in the history of economic thought.  See Hoover 
(1984) for a description of the Monetarist and New Classical Macroeconomics theories, Kydland and Prescott 
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intellectual analysis of the underlying assumptions and methodology of the ‘old’ theory.37  In 
this way the foundations of the ‘old’ theory are found inconsistent with how individuals actually 
or should behave and the ‘new’ theory corrects for this inconsistency.  This suggests that the 
evolution of macroeconomic theories focuses heavily on the underlying assumptions and so one 
might argue the discipline appears to conform with C3 and C4. 
However, the assumptions have evolved in ways that are not empirically valid as demonstrated 
in Section 4 and so this argument is flawed.  More importantly a number of the model defining 
assumptions are not poor approximations of the economy but perfectly incorrect.  In important 
ways the evolution of the assumptions underpinning the theories have been severed from the 
anchor provided by logic and the empirical analysis of the behaviour of agents and firms and 
have instead evolved along notional lines.  Therefore a strong case can be made that the 
macroeconomics discipline as represented by the two dominant macroeconomic theories 
considered above pretty well universally and consistently violates C3 and C4. 
It appears therefore that the macroeconomics discipline conforms to C1 but most likely severely 
violates C2, C3 and C4.  If this is indeed the case then we might expect the discipline to have 
the following ancillary characteristics.  One, theory papers will be valued more highly than 
applied papers because C2 and C4 are downplayed.  Similarly, papers that question the 
assumptions underpinning the theory (i.e. conforming to C3 and C4) will be very lowly valued.  
Two, journals will specialise in terms of particular theories and approaches as the downplaying 
of C2, C3 and C4 means that the discipline resists the outright rejection of the competing 
theories.  This allows ‘like-minded’ people to interact and publish ‘like-minded’ work within 
an agreed model free from the inconvenience of critical empirical analysis of the predictions 
and underlying model defining assumptions.  For the same reasons particular universities will 
be over-represented in the papers in particular ‘top’ journals.  Three, the evolution of 
macroeconomics will be impeded by the lack of a proper critical and empirical analysis of the 
                                                 
(1982) for the seminal Real Business Cycle work, Hoover (2001) for DSGE technique and Woodford (2003) 
and Gali (2008) who provide excellent expositions of the NK theory. 
37  For example, the assumptions of perfect competition, fixed prices and fixed expectations in the Keynesian 
theory (in contrast with Keynes’ theory) has evolved over time into flexible prices, price-setting firms and 
rational expectations with forward looking behaviour in the NK theory which are thought to better 
approximate how agents behave and the economic structure of the economy. 
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theories in the same way as during the Scholastic Period of the Western intellectual tradition.  
Four, there will be a concentration of citations that are deemed ‘acceptable’ within the discipline 
that are based on C1 and not the remaining conditions.  And five, advancement (including 
tenure) in the profession will be heavily based on publishing in ‘top’ journals which in turn are 
heavily focused on particular macroeconomic theories.  This implies researchers who 
empirically examine the predictions and the assumptions as well as offer alternative theories 
will be under-represented in the top echelons of the discipline.38 
7. CONCLUSION 
The philosophy of science considers issues surrounding what constitutes a scientific theory, 
falsification and empirical analysis itself and therefore relevant to our understanding and 
interpretation of all four conditions in the framework developed above.39  Furthermore, an 
important component of the philosophy of science, whether it is within the sociological, 
anthropological or ‘economic incentives’ traditions, is the issue of how theories evolve and in 
particular how do groups of individuals collectively agree on how, when, and if a theory is 
replaced by a ‘new’ theory.  Again in terms of the framework above we can think of the 
philosophy of science as also helping to understand why disciplines violate conditions 2, 3, and 
4 and why the degree of violation differs between disciplines. 
One might explain the large faith based component of macroeconomics by it evolving from a 
branch of moral philosophy which may lead it to focus more on what should happen rather than 
what does happen.  However, the pure sciences were all able to break away from the faith based 
roots of the moral philosophers in the 18th and 19th Centuries by rigorously incorporating 
conditions 2, 3 and 4 into their scientific method. 
An alternative explanation is the marginal ‘revolution’ referred to in Section 4.1 was such a 
major discipline defining intellectual event for economics that profit maximisation and utility 
maximisation became necessary components of all acceptable economic theories.40  However, 
                                                 
38  Colander (1996) and Galbraith (1996) provide similar but more detailed descriptions of how the economics 
academic ‘profession’ operates.  For a humorous but no less insightful description see Leijonhufvud (1973). 
39  See the references cited in footnote 13. 
40  See Hodgson (1996). 
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this event violated C4 as the concepts of marginal costs and revenues are undefined.41  So that 
C4 could be violated on an on-going basis it is necessary for the discipline to downplay the role 
of empirical evidence in general and in relation to the undefined nature of marginal costs and 
revenues in particular.  Furthermore, the marginal revolution made it ‘acceptable’ to indulge in 
notional assumptions that routinely violate C4 when creating economic theories.  As a result 
economics failed to rigorously apply C2, C3 and C4 so that the primacy of empirical analysis 
over theory is achieved and allow economics to join physics, chemistry, medicine and biology 
as a ‘pure science’ in the late 19th Century. 
An observer may ask where the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) approach fits 
into this analysis.  The approach proceeds under the assumption that the model is ‘true’ and is 
simply calibrated so that the means and variances of ‘important’ variables are similar to their 
actual economic values.  As any model with any structure can be calibrated to produce the 
actual values the DSGE approach eschews any formal testing of the model.  Consequently, 
DSGE is not a scientific theory in the sense of Popper and violates C1, C2, C3 and C4.  Instead 
of being a theory it is a modelling technique in the same way as Monte Carlo simulations are a 
calibrated modelling technique. 
Finally, in the physical, chemical, medical and biological sciences there is the term ‘science 
fiction’ to describe ideas that are in some sense scientific but include a component of fantasy.  
Often the fantasy includes humans with super-human characteristics like they can fly, are 
indestructible, read minds, see through walls and see the future.  Macroeconomic agents are 
often endowed with super-human characteristics in that they can measure concepts that are 
undefined, can ‘see’ the future so as to predict the structure of the economy, prices and structural 
breaks, and are instilled with technical abilities that elude all of the most brilliantly trained 
economists.42  In every sense of the word these characteristics attributed to macroeconomic 
agents are fantasy and should be consigned to ‘economic fiction’. If not then macroeconomics 
                                                 
41  Note the advent of marginal analysis meant that agents were no longer able to recognise the concepts used by 
economists to explain their own behaviour.  Implicitly economists were saying ‘have faith, we know what 
you are doing even though you as agents will not recognise it as what you are doing’. 
42  Caballero (2010) calls the attributing of ‘superhuman’ skills and knowledge to agents by macroeconomists 
the pretense-of-knowledge syndrome. 
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will fail to join the ‘pure sciences’ as ‘macroeconomic science’ and will remain a largely faith 
based discipline made up of modern day Tron theorists. 
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Diagram 1:  The Framework for ‘Testing’ an Assumption 
 
 
